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Abstract: In his 1961 farewell address, President Eisenhower cautioned against a future in which a powerful military-industrial complex manipulated policy to the detriment of American interests. Dunlap
argues that, ½fty years later, Eisenhower’s fears have not been realized; in fact, the military-industrial
enterprise is in decline. Certainly, the U.S. military owes its continued preeminence to both the quality of
its combatants and the superiority of its weaponry. Yet as the manpower-centric strategies in Afghanistan
and Iraq replaced technology-centric operations; as complicated defense acquisitions laws deterred companies from obtaining contracts; and as the economic downturn and rising national de½cit have strained
budgets, the defense industry has become less robust than it was in the Cold War era. Consequently, the
services are constrained by aging equipment and outdated technology, even as other countries are
strengthening their defense capabilities. While it is important to keep U.S. military and industrial power
in check, we should also be concerned about the weakening of innovative collaborations between our
nation’s military and industrial sectors.
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[The] conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. . . . [W]e must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or
unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The
potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power
exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of
this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes.
–President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1961)1

W

hen President Eisenhower uttered this warning in his farewell address, he forever ½xed in the
public mind the idea–in its most histrionic manifestation–of an ever-present menace posed by
grasping arms merchants in league with war-mongering generals. This cabal, so the theory goes,
lurks in the shadows waiting for an unguarded
moment in which to subvert the American way of
life for its own venal purposes. To writer James
Ledbetter, the stereotype of the shady arms
merchant is still alive and well. In a New York
© 2011 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences
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Times article from late 2010, he contends,
“It is not a stretch to believe that the armaments industry–which pro½ts not
only from domestic sales but also from
tens of billions of dollars in annual exports–manipulates public policy to perpetuate itself.”2
With total annual U.S. defense expenditures now exceeding $700 billion, Eisenhower’s celebrated caution seems
to many observers to be as apt today as
ever. Indeed, in the November/December 2010 issue of Foreign Affairs, political
commentator William Pfaff argues that
the full-time, professional military–
“supplemented by a nearly equivalent
number of civilian mercenaries”–substitutes for the “citizens’ army” he believes conscription produced in the past.
The result, he declares, is a force “directly accountable only to the Pentagon [and
one that] exists primarily to augment the
national ‘military-industrial complex’
against which President Dwight Eisenhower warned.”3
Pfaff’s concerns are hardly limited to
the “military” portion of Eisenhower’s
dictum. He also asserts that “defense and
security industries,” “the most important” components of the U.S. manufacturing sector, are positioned to “dominate Congress, as well as an inexperienced administration” via the industries’
“corporate interests.” To Pfaff, the United States is “a state owned by its army.”4
Ledbetter and Pfaff are not alone in
their critique of the interplay between
military money and American policy and
stature abroad. In a May 2010 speech,
Republican Representative Ron Paul of
Texas railed against “blank checks to the
military-industrial complex,” which, he
maintains, does little to defend against
authentic threats. Paul contends that
costly overseas military operations “in
many cases foment resentment that does
not make us safer, but instead makes us

a target.” Further, if military spending is
inadequately examined, he argues, it will
exacerbate the U.S. budget crisis that is
“bankrupting the nation and destroying
our own currency.”5
To what extent do the concerns raised
by Ledbetter, Pfaff, and Paul reflect Eisenhower’s original thinking? If America’s
powerful military is popular and trusted
by the electorate, does its reputation indicate the “proper meshing” of military and
industry that the farewell address calls
for? Or should we be as concerned today
as Eisenhower was ½ve decades ago?
Eisenhower was apparently thinking
of the future, not accusing contemporary
institutions of malevolence. Referring to
“unwarranted influence” both “sought”
and “unsought,” he took care not to cast
aspersions on anyone. In fact, recent
scholarship reveals that Eisenhower deliberately toned down his language from
that of more antagonistic earlier drafts.6
As the former ½ve-star general who led
the allied effort to defeat the Nazis, he, of
all people, appreciated the need for a
powerful military buttressed by a strong
and creative industrial infrastructure.
Rather than criticizing either the military or the arms industry, Eisenhower
merely pointed out that the Cold War had
created for the ½rst time in American history a need to maintain, in a period of putative peace, a very large military establishment as well as an equally sizable
arms industry. To Eisenhower, this unprecedented phenomenon required constant scrutiny by the electorate. An “alert
and knowledgeable citizenry,” he said,
was necessary to ensure “the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military
machinery of defense . . . so that security
and liberty may prosper together.”7

The prescription for an “alert and knowl-

edgeable citizenry” is perhaps the strongest rationale for the continuing vitality
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of Eisenhower’s speech–albeit for reasons he may not have anticipated. In
truth, a robust “military-industrial complex” remains an essential element of a
democracy facing diverse and existential threats in a dangerous world. In the
twenty-½rst century, however, America’s
citizenry needs to be alert not just to the
risk of capitalism cum militarism run
amok, but also–paradoxically–to the
perils of a declining military-industrial
enterprise. Surprisingly, accumulating
evidence shows that the complex’s oncefeared power is rapidly and dangerously
ebbing. Virtually all experts agree that
America’s armed forces have achieved–
and continue to maintain–their martial
dominance not just because of the quality of their combatants, but also because
of the superiority and abundance of their
weaponry and equipment. Those attributes, in turn, are the result of the creativity and productivity that a highly competitive free-enterprise system generates.
In the defense sector, however, that competitiveness is evidently waning. In 2008,
the Defense Science Board glumly noted
how the military-industrial complex had
transformed since Eisenhower expressed
his qualms:
The U.S. Defense industrial base changed
signi½cantly . . . since the end of the Cold
War. . . . From ½fty major defense contractors at the beginning of the 1990s, the defense industry consolidated into six large
defense ½rms by the end of the decade.
While competition still occurs between a
few ½rms in each sector, the Government
buyer can no longer bene½t from a highly
competitive defense market.8

In its 2010 report to Congress on industrial capabilities, the Pentagon insists
that it still relies on market forces to maintain the vitality of the industrial base. At
the same time, it reiterates concerns
about the loss of competition to consoli140 (3) Summer 2011

dation over the past decade, conceding Charles J.
further that “the pace of these consolida- Dunlap, Jr.
tions does not seem to be slackening.”9
Consolidation does not, as Eisenhower’s
admonition might have supposed, translate into an even more powerful and united military-industrial establishment; to
the contrary, consolidation reflects the
complex’s declining fortunes.
Decline? With a budget of over $700
billion? How can the military-industrial
complex be eroding given that the U.S.
share of defense spending amounts to
nearly 48 percent of the worldwide total?
While these ½gures may seem remarkable, military spending as a percentage
of gdp has dropped strikingly since the
Eisenhower era. In 1961, defense spending constituted 9.4 percent of gdp10; by
2010, it had fallen by half, to 4.7 percent,
and much of that is not headed to arms
makers’ coffers.
This shift is caused in part by changes
in how the Pentagon identi½es and responds to threats. In the latest version of
the congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense Review, the Pentagon declares that “America’s interests and role
in the world require armed forces with
unmatched capabilities”; nevertheless, it
narrows that globally oriented perspective by de½ning its top objective as prevailing in “today’s wars” in Afghanistan
and Iraq.
The focus on Iraq and Afghanistan has
signi½cant implications for the defense industry because the strategy employed in
those wars is manpower-intensive and inclined toward low-tech solutions. Based
on the highly acclaimed counterinsurgency doctrine authored largely by the
popular and politically savvy General
David Petraeus, the strategy eschews technology, arms, and equipment. Instead,
the approach favors deploying masses of
foot soldiers, each one prepared to become a “social worker, a civil engineer, a
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school teacher, a nurse, a boy scout.”11
Embraced by liberals and conservatives
alike, the doctrine justi½ed a huge expansion of American ground forces.12
A manpower-centric strategy is, however, extremely costly. The military spends
about $1 million to deploy a single soldier
to Afghanistan for one year.13 Moreover,
the cost of military personnel, deployed
or not, is soaring. With expenditures for
military health care alone now topping
$50 billion a year, Defense Secretary
Robert Gates understandably claims that
such expenses are “eating the Defense
Department alive.” Unlike Eisenhower’s
era of poorly compensated conscription
forces, today the Department of Defense
(dod) must fund a growing panoply of
bene½ts and inducements enacted to support the all-volunteer military since the
draft ended in 1973.
Financing this new kind of military is
creating what one Pentagon of½cial has
called a looming “½scal calamity.” The
consequences for the arms industry are
clear: an unnamed of½cial told The Washington Post that the “government’s generosity [toward military personnel] is
unsustainable” and that such expenses
will leave the Pentagon with “less money
to buy weapons.”14 Few of what dollars
remain will be allocated to the expensive
“Cold War” weaponry and missiles that
concerned Eisenhower.15
The producers of intercontinental ballistic missiles, for example, are unlikely
to acquire the “misplaced power” Eisenhower feared. To the contrary, Ilan Berman of the American Foreign Policy
Council warns: “[P]ractically every declared nuclear weapon state is engaged in
a serious modernization of its strategic
arsenal. The United States, by contrast,
has allowed its strategic infrastructure to
atrophy since the end of the Cold War.”16
Sophisticated weaponry does not appear to be a Pentagon priority, notwith-

standing the influential status supposedly enjoyed by arms makers. Secretary
Gates plainly states that “any major
weapons program, in order to remain viable, will have to show some utility and
relevance to the kind of irregular campaigns that . . . are most likely to engage
America’s military in the coming decades.”17 Irrelevant, it seems, are the bigticket, high-technology air and naval
platforms that enriched many defense
½rms in Eisenhower’s day.
To be sure, equipment still plays a vital
role in irregular warfare. Retired Army
General Barry McCaffrey argues that the
combined effects of such developments
as unmanned drones and hyper-accurate
munitions have “fundamentally changed
warfare.”18 However, many of those advances do not necessarily reflect new programs that stimulate industry to produce
particularly inventive or revolutionary
technologies. Rather, these innovations
more often represent a repurposing of
existing equipment designed and built
for use against Cold War adversaries.
Notably, one of the largest new equipment programs speci½cally designed to
address the “irregular campaigns” that
Secretary Gates refers to did not emanate
from the machinations of the militaryindustrial complex or, for that matter, the
Pentagon. Congress initiated the $35 billion Mine Resistant Ambush-Protected
(mrap) vehicle program in response to
constituent complaints about horri½c
injuries to soldiers from improvised explosive devices (ieds) in Iraq and, later,
in Afghanistan. In terms of impact on the
industrial base, the mrap venture produced few new or dramatic innovations.
Why did the program fail to encourage
technological advancement? The urgency of the acquisition program required it
to rely “only on proven technologies
and commercially available products.”
Further, in order to rapidly “expand lim-
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ited production capacity,” contracts were
spread to nine commercial sources.”19
Even with these precautions, the program
is not without dif½culties. Indeed, the
Congressional Research Service recently reported that “almost 5,000 mraps in
Afghanistan are not being used because
of their size and weight” as well as “possible redundancies” with other equipment.20 This excess inventory all but guarantees that the manufacturers will not coalesce into a permanent military-industrial entity capable of the overreaching
Eisenhower feared.

I

nitially, contractors providing services
seemed to fare better than arms makers
in pro½ting from Gates’s “irregular campaigns.” Counterinsurgency expert T. X.
Hammes argues that the extensive use of
such contractors–including those that
provide armed security services–in conflict areas “aligned with previous decisions and the administration’s faith in
the ef½ciency and effectiveness of private
business compared to governmental organization.”21 However, widely reported
allegations of abuse and fraud obliged
Congress to intervene. Beginning with
the creation, in 2004, of the Of½ce of the
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction,22 Congress used investigations, hearings, and new laws to rein in
contractors in war zones.23 With more
regulation likely to be forthcoming, it
seems clear that even if this assemblage
of contractors had designs on “unwarranted influence,” recent events have conspired to prevent such an outcome.
Additionally, the halcyon days for service support and advisory contractors
stationed away from the battle½eld
appear to have ended as well. Secretary Gates concludes that the dod has
“grown over-reliant on contractors.” He
suggests they “may be performing functions that should be done by full-time
140 (3) Summer 2011

government employees, including man- Charles J.
aging other contractors.” Consequent- Dunlap, Jr.
ly, Gates directed the dod to “reduce
funding for service support contractors
by 10 percent each year for the next three
years.”24 Accordingly, much of the work
formerly done by outside contractors is
being in-sourced to dod employees.25
All this activity portends the weakening
influence of contractors in the Pentagon
and elsewhere.
The complexities of defense acquisition laws and regulations put in place
since 1961 also diminish the cohesion
that would facilitate the accumulation of
“unwarranted influence” by the militaryindustrial complex. According to Patrick
Wilson, the director of government affairs for the Semiconductor Industry Association, the “defense acquisition process is so cumbersome that many hightech ½rms shun government sales.” The
bureaucracy of the procurement system,
he says, is “ridiculous.”26
Calling the acquisition system “ridiculous” may be an exaggeration, but not by
much–even when the stakes are very
high. For example, the Air Force has been
trying since 2002 to replace its aging aerial tanker fleet, whose aircraft, on average, are more than forty-seven years old.
Yet a variety of legal and technical issues
stymied the project for years, despite its
being valued at as much as $35 billion.27
A sophisticated military-industrial complex endowed with treacherous proclivities toward excessive influence would be
expected to have greater success in bringing such a lucrative opportunity to fruition sooner.
Another factor diminishing the ability
of major defense ½rms to accrete unbounded power is the maze of legally
mandated acquisition polices intended
to serve social purposes as much as
strengthen national security. For instance, The Washington Post reports that a
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“tiny, inexperienced ½rm” received a
$250 million contract “without competition, under special set-aside exemptions
granted by Congress to help impoverished Alaska natives.” At the time of the
contract award, the company had only
eighteen employees and $73,000 in revenue the previous year.28 However one
views the wisdom of set-asides, adherence to such exemption policies seems to
counteract concerns about the dangerous
influence of huge corporate monoliths.

Of all the factors emasculating Ameri-

ca’s military-industrial complex, however, none is as signi½cant as current economic conditions. The arms industry is
caught in the throes of forces vastly more
powerful than it could aspire to wield:
the severe global economic downturn;
the near meltdown of the U.S. ½nancial
system; and the ballooning de½cit all combine to spark calls on both sides of the
political aisle for sharp cuts in discretionary spending–a major portion of which
is the defense budget.
Military spending distressed and frustrated Eisenhower. His melancholia is captured in a 1953 remark that, though less
well known than his farewell address, is
powerful and thought-provoking:
Every gun that is made, every warship
launched, every rocket ½red signi½es, in
the ½nal sense, a theft from those who
hunger and are not fed, those who are cold
and not clothed. This world in arms is not
spending money alone. It is spending the
sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.29

Although the American people have
generally endorsed expanding military
budgets since 9/11, that support may be
flagging–especially with respect to war
costs in Afghanistan. According to a usa
Today/Gallup poll in late November 2010,
60 percent of Americans worry that “costs
140

of the war in Afghanistan will make it
more dif½cult for the government to
address the problems facing the United
States at home.”30 Likewise, an abc
News/Washington Post poll in early December 2010 found support at historic
lows, with 60 percent of Americans characterizing the war, in ½scal terms, as “not
worth ½ghting.”31
Secretary Gates, who gamely insists
that “the truth of the matter is when it
comes to the de½cit, the Department of
Defense is not the problem,”32 supports a
series of cost-saving initiatives to address
potential defense spending reductions,
including cuts in selected weapons systems. Although he wants to invest the
savings in fewer but higher-priority systems, hopes are dimming in the defense
industry that arms purchases of any kind
will escape the budgetary ax, especially
given that the president’s highly influential National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform recommends applying any savings generated by the dod
to de½cit reduction, not weapons.33
While “despondent” would be too
strong a word, there is little evidence that
arms manufacturers are bullish about the
future of arms sales. They are likely to
embrace the blunt advice issued by defense analyst Loren Thompson in late
2010. Commenting on a recent solicitation for a new Army ground combat vehicle, Thompson surmised:
[D]efense companies need to start thinking
seriously about diversifying their product
mix away from a capricious government
customer. Diversi½cation is the “D” word
defense investors are loathe to voice, but
look at what General Dynamics accomplished by its foray into business jets and
you begin to see a way forward for defense
companies in what could be a very bleak
decade.34

Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences

Clearly, the industrial part of the mili-

tary-industrial complex has not developed
in a way that might have caused Eisenhower great alarm. Given the relative
impotence of the defense industry, then,
how wary are the American people today
of the military’s potential for per½dy? Not
very, it seems.
While no formal assessments of the
views of the U.S. body politic have asked
this question explicitly, several polls shed
some light. For example, among the institutions in which Americans had the most
con½dence in 2010, small business ranked
second only to the military.35 However,
big business–the type one would associate with Eisenhower’s admonition–
ranked almost at the bottom. Military of½cers also headed the list of institutional
leaders in whom the public had the most
con½dence, with small-business managers right behind them.36 The executives of major companies, meanwhile,
trailed both groups signi½cantly.
On values, a November 2010 Gallup
poll found that only nurses were more
highly rated in the public’s esteem than
military of½cers. Indeed, 73 percent of
Americans rated the honesty and ethical
standards of of½cers in the armed forces
as high or very high. Only 15 percent of
the public gave business executives such
high marks.37 Ironically, despite high con½dence in–and deep respect for–the
military, a majority of Americans also
said in 2010 that they do not believe the
United States will be the top military
power in twenty years. Strikingly, many
hold this view alongside the further belief that the nation “will continue to have
combat troops regularly involved in ½ghting around the world over the next two
decades.”38 How to reconcile these two
predictions is unclear; nonetheless, the
survey results suggest that the public
does not foresee an ascent of U.S. military power.
140 (3) Summer 2011

Furthermore, affection for and con½- Charles J.
dence in those serving in uniform does Dunlap, Jr.
not necessarily translate into political
power. General Wesley Clark’s 2004 presidential campaign foundered despite exemplary military service, including successful leadership of nato forces in the
1999 Kosovo conflict. Recent elections,
including the November 2010 midterms,
have witnessed a growing number of
congressional candidates who were veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; most, however, have lost their
bids.39 Perhaps the veterans’ electoral
inexperience plays a role in these losses,
but the results nevertheless intimate an
electorate that readily distinguishes between the quali½cations of uniformed
military personnel and those of political
leaders.
Additionally, a series of laws and regulations enacted in the aftermath of Watergate and other scandals pose signi½cant obstacles to the kind of military-industry collusion that underpinned Eisenhower’s 1961 warnings. The 1978 Ethics
in Government Act40 and accompanying
regulations formalized conflict-of-interest rules and ½nancial disclosure requirements designed to limit untoward influences. In a celebrated case, a senior civilian Air Force acquisition of½cial was convicted for giving Boeing, a major defense
contractor, “preferential treatment in exchange for a job.”41
Rules limiting the activities of retired
of½cers were expanded in Fall 2010. A series of reports in USA Today and other
media highlighted the role of “military
mentors,” retired generals who provide
consultation services for defense programs. USA Today claimed that 89 percent
of the mentors it found “also had ½nancial ties to defense contractors, who
could pro½t from the mentors’ connections.”42 As a result of those ½ndings,
Secretary Gates–who himself made a
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fortune in his post-cia career43–imposed a series of new rules that limited
the annual dod compensation of retired generals for mentoring services to
$179,000. The policy further obliges
them to publicly disclose their ½nancial
information and business connections to
the same degree that those still serving
on active duty are obliged to do.44

W

hat do all the developments of the
past half-century mean after the ½ftieth
anniversary of Eisenhower’s exhortation? Ledbetter claims that the warning
“is as urgent today as ever.” He points not
only to the “mounting long-term costs”
of defense but also–somewhat disconnectedly–to the alleged “use of martial
power” for the detention of terrorism
suspects at Guantánamo Bay and wiretaps of Americans.45 While Eisenhower
might have been disturbed by such events,
Ledbetter seems to conflate these contemporary issues with the gravamen of
Eisenhower’s concern: that is, the emergence of a near-conspiratorial alignment
of military leaders and their analogues in
the arms industry.
That combination does not exist. Indeed, one might say that Eisenhower’s
warning was heard and heeded–with
unintended consequences. The fading of
the American military-industrial complex impacts U.S. military capability; the
effect on America’s Air Force is but one
illustration. Whatever influence the Air
Force may have enjoyed in Eisenhower’s
day is long gone. Consider Air Force Lieutenant General David Deptula’s dismal
assessment from Fall 2010: “[W]e have a
geriatric bomber force,” Deptula concludes, and “a geriatric ½ghter force. We
have a geriatric Air Force, quite frankly.”46
Aircraft age is not the only issue; numbers and sophistication are also a concern. For example, Defense News surmised
that America’s current bomber fleet con142

stitutes a “puny force against any serious
adversary.”47 Even so, historian Michael
Auslin of the American Enterprise Institute says that today’s budget restrictions
are hitting airpower especially hard; consequently, he says, “[S]ome of the stunning joint creations of the Air Force and
America’s defense industrial base . . . will
likely never be repeated.” If budgetary
trends are not reversed, he warns, the Air
Force’s “future will look even grimmer
than it does now.”48
The deterioration of America’s defense
infrastructure has captured the attention
of Congress. During hearings on the defense industrial base in Fall 2010, Congress acknowledged “the security challenges posed by a shrinking defense
industrial base and domestic supply
chain.”49 Furthermore, Congress recognized that U.S. arms makers face the
“proliferation of foreign-made and counterfeit parts, outdated technology, and a
depleted manufacturing workforce.”50
But there are still too few tangible indications that “an alert and knowledgeable citizenry” will compel the necessary
steps to ensure the appropriate level of
military-industrial muscle is met and
maintained.
Meanwhile, we must not ignore the
fact that other nations–including potential adversaries–are strengthening their
industrial base. The Pentagon’s 2010 report reveals that China’s defense industries have undergone a “broad-based
transformation” since the 1990s. In fact,
“[a]ugmented by direct acquisition of
foreign weapons and technology, these
reforms have enabled China to develop
and produce advanced weapon systems
that incorporate mid-1990s technology
in many areas, and some systems–particularly ballistic missiles–that rival
any in the world today.”51 Ominously,
China’s industry is developing air capabilities to a degree that suggests China’s
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intention to challenge “U.S. air power in military counterparts addressed the im- Charles J.
the region.”52
peratives of the Cold War confrontation Dunlap, Jr.
In other developments that show the with the Soviet Union. That the perils of
internationalization of the arms industry, “misplaced power” were largely avoided
Russia and India have signed a deal to is a critically important lesson. That is,
build hundreds of new “½fth generation” inevitability need not be part of the lexiwarplanes designed to best America’s con of this issue.
most advanced ½ghters.53 In light of such
Were he alive today, Eisenhower unreports, many experts are concerned that doubtedly would have recognized that
any additional cuts in U.S. defense spend- dismissing the military-industrial coming “will dangerously erode the techno- plex as the inveterate enemy of democralogical edge that America’s armed forces cy is wrong and dangerous. Thanks largedepend upon, and deserve.”54 As Ilan ly to Eisenhower’s eloquent expression
Berman puts it, “Stagnation [in the de- of caution, the United States has shown
fense industry] threatens U.S. arms supe- that it can effectively limit the reach of
riority.”55 Some analysts go further. Ac- the military-industrial establishment.
cording to political commentator Zbig- Now the question may be whether conniew Mazurak, “[T]he U.S. is no longer trolling influences–“sought or unsought”
unrivalled in terms of conventional –have taken us too far.
weapons. Conventional threats are real
Writing in The Wall Street Journal in late
and growing.”56
2010, novelist Mark Helprin warns:
The problem, however, may run deep[History] tells us that, entirely indepener. Some analysts observe an “anti-moddent of economic considerations, although
ern warfare prejudice” within the U.S. milnot a dime should be appropriated to the
itary itself.57 Perhaps an outgrowth of the
military if it is not necessary, not a dime
manpower-intensive counterinsurgency
should be withheld if it is. The proof of
strategy in vogue today, this trend runs
this, so often and so tragically forgotten, is
counter to the “high-technology” emphathat the costs of providing an undauntable
sis that strategist Colin Gray calls “the
defense, whatever they may be, pale before
American way in warfare.” Indeed, Gray
blood and defeat.59
contends, American society “cannot possibly prepare for, or attempt to ½ght, its
Even the most ardent advocate of Eiwars in any other than a technology-led senhower’s farewell address would be
manner.”58 But the ability to maintain wise to ponder that sentiment.
such an approach depends on the existence of a vigorous, innovative, and
pro½table military-industrial enterprise.

Eisenhower’s dictum will always serve

as a useful bellwether for the disquieting
prospect of an unchecked confederation
of military and industrial power. Still, in
twenty-½rst-century America, the importance of context is becoming ever more
evident. During Eisenhower’s presidency, a robust industrial base working effectively (if not always ef½ciently) with its
140 (3) Summer 2011
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